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Stubbs v. Lee, supra [64 Me. 195 (18 Am. Rep. 251).] 
Thence [sic.] it is that two such offices must be held to be 
incompatible. " 
[6] The two offices in question being incompatible, it fol-
lows that when the respondent accepted the office of city 
attorney, said acceptance had the effect of vacating or ter-
minating his right to hold the office of city judge. As was 
said in Peoplev. Garrett, supra: "The rule is settled with 
unanimity that where an individual is an incumbent of a 
public office and, during such incumbency, is appointed or 
elected to another public office and enters upon the duties of 
the latter, the first office becomes at once vacant if the two 
are incompatible (Mechem on Public Officers, sec. 419; 22 
R. C. L., sec. 63) . . . " 
McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, second edition, vol-
ume 2, section 469, thus states the rule: "The common law 
rule is that the acceptance by a public officer of another office 
which is incompatible with the first thereby vacates the first 
office; that is, the mere acceptance of the second incompatible 
office per se terminates the first office as effectively as a 
resignation. " 
[7] It appearing from what we have said in the fore-
going opinion that respondent was at the time of the com-
mencement of this action unlawfully holding the office of city 
judge of the city of San Bruno, the present proceeding in 
quo warranto was the proper method of challenging his right 
thereto, and the complaint on behalf of appellant alleged 
sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action, and defend-
ant's demurrer thereto should have been overruled. 
The judgment is reversed with directions to the trial court 
to overrule the demurrer and proceed with the disposition 
of the cause in accordance with the views herein expressed. 
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[L. A. No. 16921. In Bank.-November 28, 1940.] 
MARY L. BEARD, Respondent, v. FRANK A. BEARD, Ap-
pellant. 
[1] JUDGMENTS-OPENING AND VACATING JUDGMENTS AND DEFAULT!r-
DISCRETION OF COURT--DISCRETION AS TO OPENING DEFAULTs.-The 
right to set aside a default judgment within six months after 
entry for inadvertence, mistake, and excusable neglect under Code 
Civ. Pro c., sec. 473, rests largely within the discretion of the 
trial court, the exorcise of which will not be disturbed on appeal 
in the absence of a clear showing of abuse of discretion. 
[2] ID.-OPENING AND VACATING JUDGMENTS AND DEFAULTS-GROUNDS 
FOR RELIEF-EXCUSABLE NEGLECT AND INADVERTENCE-APPLICATION 
OF RULE-NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN PARTIEs.-The exercise of a trial 
court's discretion in setting aside a default judgment under Code 
Civ. Proc., sec. 473, will not be disturbed on appeal where it was 
based on a showing of continued negotiations between the parties 
for a settlement of their e1aims out of court, which 'lulled the at-
torney into a sense of security by reason of which he failed to 
file an answer. 
[3] ID.-OPENING AND VACATING JUDGMENTS AND DEFAULTS-GROUNDS 
FOR RELIEF-IGNORANCE-IGNORANCE OF LAw.-Ignorance of the 
law on the part of an attorney is not ordinarily a sufficient· ground 
for setting aside a default judgment under Code Civ. Proc., see. 
473. 
[4] ID.-OPENING AND VACATING JUDGME.t<TS AND DEFAULTS-GROUNDB 
FOR RELIEF-IN GENERAIr-STATEMENTS 'OF CoUNSEL AS AFFECTING 
GROUNDS URGEABLE.-The fact that plaintiff's attorney, when a de-
fault judgment on a cross· complaint was set up in defense of the 
original cause, erroneously stated that no answer could be filed 
to a complaint for declaratory relief, does not bar him from moving 
to set aside the judgment on other grounds. 
[5] ID.-OPENING AND VACATING JUDGMENTS AND DEFAULTS-PROCEDURE 
TO OBTAIN RELIEF-AFFIDAVIT OR OTHER SHOWING OF MERITS-
NECESSITY FOR.-Before a trial court can be called upon to exercise 
2. Relief from def~ult judgment due to mistake or oversight of 
counsel generally, note, 126 A. L. R. 367. See, also, 14 Oal. Jur. 1072. 
5. Necessity of showing meritorious defense, notes, .34 A. L. B. 
215; 118 A. L. R. 1464; 122 A. L. R. 621. See, also,14 Oal. Jur~ 1052; 
31 Am. Jur. 311; 15 R. O. L. 71. 
McK. Dig. References: 1. Judgments, § 157; 2. Judgments, § 177 
(1); 3. Judgments, § 178; 4. Judgments, § 163; 5,6. Judgments, § 209; 
7. Judgments, § 210 (2); 8. Pleading, § 220; 9. Judgments, § 211 • 
• 
• 
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its discretion under Code Civ. Proc., sec. 473, in relieving from a 
default judgment, the party ill default must show not only a good 
excuse for his default, but also that he has a meritorious defense 
to the action. 
[6] rD.-OPENING AND VACATING JUDGMENTS AND DEFAULTS-PROCEDURE 
TO OBTAIN RELIEF-AFFIDAVIT OR OTHER SHOWING OF MERITS-How 
MERITORIOUS DEFENSE SHOwN.-The showing of a meritorious de-
fense ·by a party moving to set aside a default judgment under 
Code Civ. Pro c., sec. 473, is usually made either by additional affida-
vit or by a copy of the· proposed verified pleading required to ac-
. company the· application. 
[7] rD.-OPENING AND VACATING JUDGMENTS AND DEFAULTS-PROCEDURE 
TO OBTAIN RELIEF-REQUISITES AND SUFFICIENCY OF AFFIDAVIT m' 
MERITS-STATEMENT' TO AND ADVICE OF COUNSEL.-An affidavit of 
meritorious defense used on a motion under Code Civ. Proc., sec. 
473, must state the client's belief in the merits of his case, and 
must show that he has fully and fairly stated the facts of the case 
to his attorney, whereupon counsel's advice amounts to a prima facie 
showing of merit. An affidavit which merely avers that the party 
"had a good defense" is insufficient. 
[8] PLEADING---SIGNATURE AND VERIFICATION-WHO MAY VERIFy-AT' 
TORNEY.-An attorney may properly verify a proposed answer where 
the party is out of the state. (Oode Civ. Proc., sec. 446.) 
[9] JUDGMENTS-OPENING AND VACATING JUDGMENTS AND DEFAULTS-
PROOEDURE TO OBTAIN RELIEF-PLEADINGS SHOWING MERITS.-There ~ 
is a sufficient showing of a meritorious defense for a motion under 
Code Civ. Proc., sec. 473, where a copy of the proposed answer 
accompanying the application denies a material allegation of the 
cross-complaint and is properly verified by the attorney as being 
true of his own knowledge. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los An-
geles County granting a motion to set aside a default judg-
ment. Robert W. Kenny, Judge. Order affirmed. 
Euler & Subith, Louis J. Euler and Lois R. Mead for Ap-
pellant. 
Luther F. Opelt for Respondent. 
6. Sufficiency of affidavit of merits on motion to set aside, note, 
124 A. L. R. 149. See, also, 14 Oal. Jur. 1051 et seq; 31 Am. Jur. 
312; 15 R. C. L. 718. 
8. Verification of pleading by attorney of party, note, 7 A. L. R. 5. 
See, also, 21 CaL Jur. 218; 21 R. C. L. 491. 
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TRAYNOR, J.-Respondent brought suit against appellant 
in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County on a judgment 
for payment of alimony secured in the Oircuit Court of the 
State of Oregon. Appellant filed a cross-complaint allegi~g 
that the original alimony decree had been entered pursuant to 
a stipulation between the parties calling for payments for a 
period of only two years and that such payments had been 
made, and asking for a determination of his rights and duties 
under the stipUlation and original judgment. The cross-com-
plaint was duly served on respondent's attorney but respond-
ent failed to file an answer. The court entered a default 
judgment declaring that appellant was" entitled to a satis-
faction of said [prior] judgment and a release from further 
liabilit.y thereunder." When respondent's original cause came 
on for trial the appellant set up the judgment on the cross-
complaint in defense and was sustained by the court. At this 
time the attorney for the respondent stated as his reason for 
failing to answer the cross-complaint: "You cannot file an 
answer to a complaint for declaratory relief", whereupon he 
was informed of his error by the court. Respondent then filed 
a motion to set aside the default judgment because of inad-
vertence, mistake and excusable neglect under Oode of Oivil 
Procedure, section 473, alleging that continued negotiations 
between respondent and appellant for a settlement of their 
claims out of court had lulled the attorney for the respondent 
into a sense of security by reason of which he failed to file 
an answer to the cross-complaint. Accompanying the motion 
was an affidavit by the respondent's attorney to the effect that 
the respondent had a good defense to the cross-complaint and 
appended thereto was a proposed answer to the cross-com-
plaint verified by the respondent's attorney. The court 
granted the motion to set aside the default judgment. The 
appellant has appealed from the order granting this motion. 
[1] The right to set aside a default judgment within six 
months of entry for inadvertence, mistake, and excusable 
neglect under Oode of Civil Procedure, section 473, is a 
matter largely within the discretion of the trial court and will 
not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear showing 
that this discretion has been abused. (County of Los Angeles 
v. Lewis, 179 Oal. 398 [177 Pac. 154]; Waite v. Southern Pac. 
Co., 192 Oal. 467 [221 Pac. 204] ; Brooks v. Nelson, 95 Cal. 
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[274 Pac. 579].) [2] In the present case the trial court 
found that there was a sufficiently reasonable excuse to justify 
the setting aside of the default judgment, apparently on the 
basis of respondent's allegation that the continued negotia-
tibns between the respondent and appellant had lulled the 
respondent's attorney into a sense of security. This exercise 
of discretion presents no appareni abuse to justify interfer-
ence by this court. [3] While it is true, as appellant con-
tends, that ignorance of the law on the part of an attorney 
is not ordinarily sufficient grounds for setting aside a default 
judgment under section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure 
(Shearman v. Jorgensen, 106 Cal. 483 [39 Pac. 863] ; Kam-
merer v. Marino, 66 Cal. App. 720 [226 Pac. 980] ; Alferitz 
v. Oahen, 145 Cal. 397 [78 Pac. 878]), [4] the mere fact 
that respondent's attorney erroneously stated in comt that 
no answer could be filed to a complaint for declaratory relief 
does not bar respondent from asserting other grounds for 
setting aside the default which the court might find sufficient. 
[5] Before the trial court can be called upon to exercise 
its discretion in relieving from a default judgment, however, 
the party in default must show not only a good excuse for his 
default, but also, that he, has a meritorious defense to the 
action. (Brooks v. Nelson, supra; Nickerson v. CaliforniaJ! 
Raisin Co., 61 Cal. 268; Greenamyer v. Board of Lugo E. S. 
DiStrict, 116 Cal. App. 319 [2 Pac. (2d) 848]; Doyle v. Rice 
Ranch O~7, Co., 28 Cal. App. (2d) 18 [81 Pac. (2d) 980]; 
Morganv. McDonald, 70 Cal. 32 [11 Pac. 350].) [6] The 
showing of meritorious defense is usually made either by 
additional affidavit or by a copy of the proposed verified 
pleading which is required by section 473 to accompany the 
application. [7] If an affidavit of meritorious defense is 
presented, it must state the elient's belief in the merits of his 
case, and it must show that he has fully and' fairly stated the 
facts of the case to his attorney, in which situation the advice 
of counsel amounts to a prima facie showing of merit. (Jan-
son v. Bryant, 52 Cal. App. 505 [199 Pac. 542] ; Nickerson v. 
California Raisin Co., supra; Greenamyer v. Board of Lugo 
E. S. District, supra; Ross v. San Diego Glazed C. P. Co., 50 
Cal. App. 170 [194 Pac. 1059] ; Pingree v. Reynolds, 23 Cal. 
App. (2d) 649 [73 Pac. (2d) 1266] ; Andrews v. Jacoby, 39 
Cal. App. 382 [178 Pac. 969] ; Gm v. Peppin, 41 Cal. App. 
487 [182 Pac. 815].) In the present case, the affidavit filed 
Nov. 1940.] BEARD 'V. BEARD. 649. ,-/ 
by the attorney for respondent is defective in that it fails 
to show respondent had fully and fairly stated all the facts 
of the case to her attorney, the only averment in this regard 
being "That plaintiff had a good defense to said cross-com-
plaint. " (Ibid.) There was appended to the affidavit, how-
ever, [8] a proposed answer by respondent to the cross-com-
plaint properly verified by her attorney as respondent was 
out of the state. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 446.) [9] I~ his 
verification respondent's attorney stated "that he 'has read 
the foregoing answer and knows 'the contents thereof, and 
that the same is true of his own knowledge." The filing of 
such a proposed answer is clearly a proper method of showing 
a meritorious defense (Salsberry v. Julian, 98 Cal. App. 638, 
639 [277 Pac. 516]; Savage v. Smith, 170 Cal. 472 [150 Pac. 
353] ; Sampanes v. Chazes, 54 Cal. App. 612 [202 Pac. 462] ; 
Park v. Hillman, 67 Cal. App. 92 [224 Pac. 100]), and since 
the attorney in his verification stated that the contents were 
true to his knowledge" all necessary requirements were met. 
The proposed answer denied the allegation in the cross-com-
plaint that appellant had fully performed all the terms and 
conditions of the alimony judgment and was entitled to a 
release from further liability, thereby clearly raising an issue 
of' fact and law which the court was justified in holding a 
meritorious defense. 
The order of the trial court is affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Houser, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and 
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